Towards a Theoretical Model of Social Media Surveillance in Contemporary Society. by Fuchs, Christian et al.
Christian Fuchs and Daniel Trottier
Towards a theoretical model of social
media surveillance in contemporary society
Abstract: ‘Social media’ like Facebook or Twitter have become tremendously
popular in recent years. Their popularity provides new opportunities for data
collection by state and private companies, which requires a critical and theo-
retical focus on social media surveillance. The task of this paper is to outline a
theoretical framework for defining social media surveillance in the context of
contemporary society, identifying its principal characteristics, and understand-
ing its broader societal implications. Social media surveillance is a form of
surveillance in which different forms of sociality and individuals different so-
cial roles converge, so that surveillance becomes a monitoring of different activ-
ities in different social roles with the help of profiles that hold a complex net-
worked multitude of data about humans.
Keywords: surveillance, internet, social media, society, social theory, sociologi-
cal theory, communication theory
1 Introduction
The uncovering of the existence of the global internet surveillance system
PRISM, in which Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Skype, Twitter and others
participate, has shown the importance of understanding internet and social
media surveillance.
‘Social media’ and ‘web 2.0’ are terms that have been employed in recent
years to describe the information, communication, community, and colabora-
tion features of blogs (e.g., Blogger), social networking sites (e.g., Facebook),
video hosting platforms and sites (e.g., YouTube), wikis (e.g., Wikipedia) and
microblogs (e.g., Twitter).
The task of this paper is to outline a theoretical framework for defining
social media surveillance in the context of contemporary society, identifying its
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major characteristics, and understanding its main societal implications. First,
we introduce a theoretical model of the information process. Then we introduce
a theoretical model for conceptualizing modern society. These two models are
then combined for the purpose of defining the social media surveillance pro-
cess. Societal implications of social media surveillance are discussed and final-
ly some conclusions are drawn.
2 The information process
In order to understand how internet surveillance works, we first need a model
that explains how the human information process works. One such model is
based on Hegelian dialectical philosophy, which allows us to identify three
levels/stages of social life: cognition, communication and co-operation (Fuchs,
2008, 2010). In this dialectical approach, information is conceived as a dynamic
threefold process, in which, based on subjective cognitive processes, social
relations emerge (communication) in which new systems and qualities can be
formed (co-operation). It is a threefold process of cognition, communication,
and co-operation. The triad can also be seen as one of the individual, social
relations, and social systems. This corresponds to the three steps of develop-
ment in Hegelian dialectics (being-in-itself/identity, being-for-another, being-
in-and-for-itself, see Hegel, 1812, 1830). The tripleC (CCC) information model is
visualized in Figure 1. Figure 2 visualizes the dialectical process and its three
dimensions.
Cognition, communication and co-operation form with nature a structural
basis for social life. Individual action is the basis of communication, which in
Figure 1: The information process.
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Figure 2: Hegel’s model of dialectics.
turn is the basis of corporate endeavors as well as community building. Media
have always played an important role in these stages. Since they transform
thought into digital content and transmit that content to other users, all media
technologies have played a crucial role in these functions.
What is unique about social media is the fact that they collapse these three
processes together. Individual cognition almost automatically becomes a matter
of social relations, and a cooperative endeavor. For instance, one may write a
reflexion on my profile. By default, other users will see this reflexion, and be
able to respond to it. The reflexion becomes a statement towards others, and
also becomes a project. If one wrote this statement on a word processor, it
would remain in the first stage. If one wrote it on a conventional website, it
would remain in the second stage. All media are social in the sense that they
are tools of cognition. Some of them are social in the sense of allowing commu-
nication (e.g., the telephone). Some of them are also tools of co-operation (such
as the internet, wikis, and computer-supported-cooperative-work (CSCW)
tools). An important characteristic of ‘social media’ like Facebook is the conver-
gence of the three spheres of sociality.
To understand social media surveillance, we not only need a model for
understanding the underlying information processes, but also a model of socie-
ty that allows understanding of the societal context of data processing.
3 A theoretical model of modern society
Modern society is based on the differentiation of social roles. In modern society,
human beings act in different capacities in different social roles. Consider the
115
example of a modern middle-class office worker who also has roles as a hus-
band, father, lover, friend, voter, citizen, child, fan, neighbor, to say nothing
of the various associations to which he may belong. In these different roles,
humans are expected to behave according to specific rules that govern the
various social systems of which modern society is composed (such as the com-
pany, the schools, the family, the church, fan clubs, political parties, etc.).
Jürgen Habermas (1987, 1989) describes how modern society is grounded
in different spheres, in which humans act in different roles. He says that mod-
ernity resulted in:
(a) the separation of the economy from the family and the household so that
the modern economy (based on wage labor and capital) emerged,
(b) he rise of a political public sphere in which humans act as citizens who
vote, hold a political opinion, etc., in contrast to the earlier monarchic
system, in which political power was controlled by the monarch, aristocra-
cy, and the church. This process includes the shift of the economy towards
a capitalist economy grounded in private ownership of the means of pro-
duction and on the logic of capital accumulation. The economy started to
be no longer part of private households, but became organized with the
help of large commodity markets that go beyond single households. The
modern economy has become “a private sphere of society that […] [is] pub-
licly relevant” (Habermas, 1989, p. 19). The family started to be no longer
primarily an economic sphere, but the sphere of intimacy and the house-
hold economy based on reproductive labor. This was connected to the sepa-
ration of the private and the public sphere that is based on humans acting
in different roles (Habermas, 1989, pp. 152, 154; see also Arendt, 1958,
pp. 47, 68).
Habermas (1987) defines the economy and the state as systems that are guided
by the steering media of money and power, respectively. The modern economy
is the capitalist way of organizing production, distribution, and consumption,
that is, it is a system that is based on the accumulation of money capital by
the sale of commodities that are produced by workers who are compelled to
sell their labor power as a commodity to owners of capital and means of pro-
duction, who thereby gain the right to exploit labor for a specific time period.
The modern political system is a bureaucratic state system in which liberal
parliamentary democracy (including political parties, elections, parliamentary
procedures), legal guarantees of bourgeois freedoms (freedoms of speech, as-
sembly, association, the press, movement, ownership, belief and thought, opin-
ion and expression), and the monopolization of the means of violence by coer-
cive state apparatuses guarantee the reproduction of the existing social order.
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Besides the capitalist economy and the state, modern society also consists
of the cultural sphere that can be divided into a private and a public culture.
Hannah Arendt stresses that the private sphere is a realm of modern society
that functions as “a sphere of intimacy” (Arendt, 1958, p. 38) and includes
family life as well as emotional and sexual relationships. Habermas adds to
this analysis that consumption plays a central role in the private sphere: “On
the other hand, the family now evolved even more into a consumer of income
and leisure time, into the recipient of publicly guaranteed compensations and
support services. Private autonomy was maintained not so much in functions
of control as in functions of consumption” (Habermas, 1989, p. 156). He further-
more points out that the private sphere is the realm of leisure activities:
“Leisure behavior supplies the key to the floodlit privacy of the new sphere, to
the externalization of what is declared to be the inner life” (Habermas, 1989,
p. 159). In other words, the role of the private sphere in capitalism identified
by Habermass as the sphere of individual leisure and consumption can be said
to guarantee the reproduction of labor power so that the latter remains vital,
productive, and exploitable.
But there are also social forms of organizing leisure and consumption, as,
for instance, fan communities, amateur sports clubs, churches, etc. This means
that there are both individual and social forms of organizing everyday life.
Together they form the sphere of culture understood as the sphere in which
mundane everyday life is organized, and meaning is given to the world. The
basic role of culture in society is that it guarantees the reproduction of the
human body and mind, and includes, on the one hand, activities like sports,
sexuality, health and social care, beauty care, and, on the other, activities like
education, knowledge production (e.g., in universities), art, literature, etc. If
these activities are organized on an individual basis, then they take place in
the private sphere; if they are organized on a social basis outside the home and
the family, then they take place in the socio-cultural sphere.
The private and the socio-cultural sphere together form the cultural sphere,
or what Habermas (1987, chapter VI. 1) terms the lifeworld: It is a realm of
society where communicative action takes place that allows definitions of a
situation and participants to obtain an understanding of the subjective, social
and objective world. It enables the “continual process of definition and redefi-
nition” (Habermas, 1987, pp. 121 f.). “Language and culture are constitutive of
the lifeworld itself” (Habermas, 1987, p. 125). Culture can only be constituted
through the speech-acts of communication. It has a social character. The life-
world also contains “culturally transmitted background knowledge” (Haber-
mas, 1987, p. 134). “The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of the
intersubjectivity of possible understanding. […] The lifeworld is, so to speak,
117
the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can recipro-
cally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjec-
tive), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle
their disagreements, and arrive at agreements” (Habermas, 1987, p. 134). The
lifeworld is the cultural realm of meaning-making, situation definition, and
where an understanding of the world is gained.
According to Habermas (1989), the realms of the systems of the economy
and the state, on the one hand, and the lifeworld (culture in our model), on
the other hand, are mediated by what he terms the public sphere or civil socie-
ty. Hegel, who is considered one of the most influential writers on civil society
(Anheier and Toepfler, 2010, p. 338), described civil society as political, and as
a sphere that is separate from the state and from the private life of the family
(Hegel, 1821, §§ 157, 261). Jürgen Habermas’ (1989) seminal work describes that
eighteenth century France and Germany were characterized by a separation of
spheres. Civil society was the private “realm of commodity exchange and social
labor” (Habermas, 1989, p. 30) distinct from the public sphere and the sphere
of public authority. This understanding was reflected in liberal market-driven
civil society conceptions of thinkers like Locke and Smith that positioned eco-
nomic man at the heart of civil society (Ehrenberg, 1999). The structural trans-
formation of the public sphere in the 19th and 20th century, according to Haber-
mas, resulted in an increasing collapse of boundaries between spheres so that
“private economic units” attained “quasi-political character” and from “the
midst of the publicly relevant sphere of civil society was formed a repoliticized
social sphere” that resulted in a “functional complex that could no longer be
differentiated according to criteria of public and private” (Habermas, 1989,
p. 148). In other words, the structural transformation Habermas describes
meant the emergence of the modern economy as a separate powerful sphere of
modern society and the separation of the economy from civil society. This no-
tion of civil society could be found in the works of Montesquieu, Rousseau
and Tocqueville and has today become the common understanding (Ehrenberg,
1999). In later works, Habermas (1987, p. 320), as a result, describes contempo-
rary modern society as consisting of systems (economic system, administrative
system) and the lifeworld (private sphere, public sphere). Civil society as part of
the lifeworld now consists of “associational networks” that “articulate political
interests and confront the state with demands arising from the life worlds of
various groups” (Habermas, 2006, p. 417). Civil society’s “voluntary associa-
tions, interest groups, and social movements always strive to maintain a meas-
ure of autonomy from the public affairs of politics and the private concerns of
economics” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. 235). Habermas (2006) mentions as examples
for civil society actors: social movements, general interest groups, advocates
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for certain interests, experts, and intellectuals. Qualities and concepts of civil
society mentioned in the literature include: voluntariness, nongovernmental
associations, healthy democracy, public sphere, exchange of opinions, political
debate, self-organization, self-reflexion, non-violence and struggle for egalitari-
an diversity (Keane, 2010; Kenny, 2007; Salzman, 2011; Sheldon, 2001, pp. 62 f.).
Salzman (2011, p. 199) mentions “environmental groups, bowling leagues,
churches, political parties, neighborhood associations, social networking inter-
net sites” as examples for civil society organizations. Keane (2010) adds chari-
ties, independent churches and publishing houses as examples. In civil society
theory, the concept of hegemony in particular has been used to stress civil
society’s aspects of contradiction, power, counter-power, ideology, and its dia-
lectical relation to the state and the economy (Anheier and Toepfler, 2010, pp.
408 ff.).
Habermas (1987, p. 320) mentions the following social roles that are consti-
tutive for modern society: employee, consumer, client and citizen. Other roles,
for example, wife, husband, houseworker, immigrant, convicts, etc. can cer-
tainly be added. So, what is constitutive for modern society is not just the
separation of spheres and roles, but also the creation of power structures, in
which roles are constituted by power relations ( e.g., employer–employee, state
bureaucracy–citizen, citizen of a nation state–immigrant, manager–assistant,
dominant gender roles–marginalized gender roles). Power means in this con-
text the disposition of actors over means that allow them to control structures
and influence processes and decisions in their own interest at the expense of
other individuals or groups.
Modern society is based on political and economic exchange relations.
Based on different roles that humans have in the lifeworld, they exchange pro-
ducts of their social actions with goods and services provided by the systems
of the state and the economy. Table 1 gives an overview of these exchanges
and specifies their two sides. The systems of the state and the lifeworld stand
in modern society in exchange relations. Lifeworld communication is, accord-
ing to Habermas (1987), based mainly on communicative action and is not
mediated by money and power; rather, they are realms of altruistic and volun-
tary behavior.
Systemic logic and exchange logic are not automatic features of these
realms, it can however shape them. The political public sphere, civic cultures,
and private life are not independent from the political and the economic sys-
tems: They create legitimacy and hegemony (political public, civic cultures) in
relation to the political system as well as consumption needs and the reproduc-
tion of labor power in relation to the economy (private life, family).
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Table 1: A typology of different forms of non-institutional action (adapted from: Offe, 1985).
Goals Recognized as legitimate (Civil society) Illegitimate
Binding for a wider community Socio-political and socio-economic move- Terrorism
ments (= political public sphere).
1) NGOs: more hierarchical, formal, lobby-
ing
2) Social movements: grassroots, informal,
protest
Non-binding for a wider Socio-cultural movements (= civic Crime
community cultures).
Consensus, shared interests and values,
affinity.
Examples: friendship networks, neighbor-
hoods, work networks, churches, sects,
sports teams, fan communities, profession-
al organizations/associations.
Claus Offe (1985) distinguishes between socio-political movements, which
want to establish binding goals for a wider community and are recognized as
legitimate, and socio-cultural movements, which want to establish goals that
are not binding for a wider community (retreat) and are considered legitimate.
Further forms of non-institutional action would be private crime (non-binding
goals, illegitimate) and terrorism (binding goals, illegitimate). Offe’s distinction
between socio-political and socio-cultural movements has been reflected in
Touraine’s (1985) distinction between social movements and cultural move-
ments. Table 1 summarizes the discussion. We add to this distinction one be-
tween socio-political and socio-economic movements.
The struggles of socio-economic movements revolved around the produc-
tion and distribution of material resources that are created and distributed in
the economic system. They are focused on questions of the production, distri-
bution and redistribution of material resources. One modern socio-economic
movement is the working-class movement that struggles for the betterment of
living conditions as they are affected by working conditions and thereby oppos-
es the economic interests of those who own capital and the means of produc-
tion. In the history of the working-class movement, there have been fierce de-
bates about the role of reforms and revolution. A more recent debate concerns
the role and importance of non-wage workers in the working class movement
(Cleaver, 2000). Another socio-economic movement is the environmental move-
ment that struggles for the preservation and sustainable treatment of the exter-
nal nature of humans (the environment). Whereas the working-class movement
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concentrates on relationships between organized groups of human beings
(classes) with definite interests, the ecological movement concentrates on the
relationship between human beings and their natural environment. Both rela-
tions (human–human, human–nature) are at the heart of the economy and
interact with each other.
Socio-political movements are movements that struggle for the recognition
of the collective identities of certain groups in society via demands on the
state. They concentrate on struggles that relate, for instance, to gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity and origin, age, neighborhood, peace or disability. Exam-
ples are the feminist movement, the gay-rights movement, the anti-racist move-
ment, the youth movement, the peace movement, the anti-penitentiary move-
ment, the anti-psychiatry movement, etc. The common characteristic of these
movements is that their struggles concentrate on recognizing specific groups
of people as having specific rights, ways of life, or identities. So, for example,
the peace and human rights movement struggles for the recognition of the basic
right of all humans to exist free from the threat of being killed or coerced by
violence. As another example, racist movements struggle for the recognition of
specific groups (like white people) as either superior and other groups as inferi-
or, or so culturally or biologically different that they need to be separated.
Socio-cultural movements are groups of people that have shared interests
and practices relating to ways of organizing their private lives. Examples in-
clude friendship networks, neighborhood networks, churches, sports groups,
fan communities, etc.
Figure 3 visualizes the model of modern society introduced in this section.
The model is grounded in the social theory insight that the relationship be-
tween structures and actors is dialectical and that both levels continuously
create each other (for dialectical solutions of the structure-agency problem in
social theory, see: Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1993; Bourdieu, 1986; Fuchs, 2003a,
2003b; Giddens, 1984).
Given that the topic of this paper is social media, the question arises how
to locate the media more generally within a model of society. Media can be
defined as structures that enable and constrain human information processes
of cognition, communication and cooperation, which are practices that produce
and reproduce informational structures. In modern society, media can be orga-
nized in different forms. Murdock (2011, p. 18) argues that the media can be
organized within the capitalist economy, the state or civil society, and this in
turn results in three different political economies of the media that are, respec-
tively, based on commodities, public goods or gifts. In our model of society,
civil society is made up of the socio-political, the socio-economic and the socio-
cultural spheres, which corresponds to the three organizational forms of the
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Figure 3: A model of modern society.
Table 2: A typology of roles in modern society.
Political roles Socio-political roles
Citizen, politician, bureaucrat, Privacy advocate, electoral reform advocate,
political party member. feminist activist, gay-rights activist, anti-racist
advocate, youth movement advocate, peace move-
ment activist, anti-penitentiary advocate, anti-
psychiatry activist, non-governmental organization
member/activist, non-parliamentary political activist
(student groups, non-parliamentary fascist groups,
non-parliamentary leftist groups, etc.).
Economic roles Socio-economic roles
Capital owner, entrepreneur, Labor activist, union member, consumer
manager, employee, prosumer, protectionists, environmental activist.
self-employee.
Private roles Socio-cultural roles
Lover, family member, friend, Sports group member, fan community member,
consumer, audience member, user. parishioner, member of a sect or cult, professional
organization and association, self-help group,
neighborhood association, etc.
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media that Murdock identifies. Therefore we identify socio-political (organized
by the state as public service media), socio-economic (organized by private
companies as commercial media) and socio-cultural (organized by citizens and
public interest groups as civil and alternative media) forms of the media. Al-
though there are three organizational forms of the media, there is a specific
political economy of the media realm that allocates resources to different media
types to a different degree, generally putting civil-society media at a disadvan-
tage, and favoring capitalist media organizations.
Based on the distinction of different spheres of modern society, we can
discern various social roles that are part of the subsystems of modern society
(see Table 2).
Based on the theoretical models of the information process and modern
society, we can next characterize social media surveillance.
4 Social media surveillance
Defining social media surveillance requires an understanding of surveillance.
Many existing definitions of surveillance stress, on the one hand, processes of
information collection and processing, and, on the other hand, processes shap-
ing behaviors (controlling, managing, governing, supervising, influencing or
regulating behaviors) (Fuchs, 2011). Many existing definitions lack further theo-
retical grounding of the underlying social processes that are said to shape hu-
man behavior. Surveillance in society involves the collection, storage, process-
ing and assessment of data about humans or groups of humans by an actor in
order to advance the latter’s goals by violence exerted with the help of the
collected information upon the humans under watch. Based on the works of
Johan Galtung (1990), violence can be defined as “avoidable insults to basic
human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satis-
faction below what is potentially possible” (Galtung, 1990, p. 292). Violence
can, according to Galtung (1990), be divided into three principal forms: direct
violence (through physical intervention; an event), structural violence (through
state or organizational mandate; a process), and cultural violence (dehumaniz-
ing or otherwise exclusionary representations; an invariance). These forms op-
erate through the denial of four basic needs: survival needs (through killing
and exploitation), well-being needs (through maiming, sanctions, and exploita-
tion), identity needs (through desocialization, resocialization and segmenta-
tion), and freedom needs (through repression, detention, expulsion, marginali-
zation and fragmentation) (Galtung, 1990). Surveillance gathers data about
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humans in order to exert actual or potential direct, structural, or cultural vio-
lence against individuals or groups. The violence involved in surveillance either
operates as actual violence (e.g., in the case where the Nazis used census data
and calculating machines in order to determine who had Jewish origins and
should be deported and killed in the Nazi extermination camps; see Black,
2012) or as the threat of violence in order to discipline human behavior ( e.g.,
when a company announces that it monitors its employee’s internet use in
order to prevent private Facebook use during working hours). Both actual vio-
lence and threats of violence constitute violence: “Threats of violence are also
violence” (Galtung, 1990, p. 292).
The study of social media surveillance is due to the novelty of blogs and
social networks like Facebook and Twitter (see Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund,
and Sandoval, 2012; Trottier, 2012; Trottier and Lyon, 2012). Based on the theo-
retical assumptions about the information process (the tripleC model intro-
duced in section 2) and society (the model of modern society in section 3), we
can describe social media surveillance based on social theory. Thus far, social
theory foundations of social media surveillance have been missing in the litera-
ture.
Some constitutive features of social media like Facebook are the following:
Integrated sociality: Social media enable the convergence of the three
modes of sociality (cognition, communication, cooperation) in an integrated
sociality. This means, for example, on Facebook an individual creates a multi-
media content like a video on the cognitive level, publishes it so that others
can comment (the communicative level), and allows others to manipulate and
remix the content, so that new content with multiple authorship can emerge.
One step does not necessarily result in the next, but the technology has the
potential to enable the combination of all three activities in one space. Face-
book, by default, encourages the transition from one stage of sociality to the
next, within the same social space.
Integrated roles: Social media like Facebook are based on the creation of
personal profiles that describe the various roles of a human being’s life. In
contemporary modern society, different social roles tend to converge in various
social spaces. The boundaries between public life and private life as well as
the work place and the home have become fuzzy and liquid. As we have seen,
Habermas identified systems (the economy, the state) and the lifeworld as cen-
tral realms of modern society. The lifeworld can be further divided into culture
and civil society. We act in different social roles in these spheres: for example,
as employees and consumers in the economic systems, as clients and citizens
in the state system, as activists in the socio-political and socio-economic
spheres, as lovers, consumers or family members in the private sphere, or as
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fan community members, parishioners, professional association members, etc.
in the socio-cultural sphere (see Table 2). A new form of liquid and porous
sociality has emerged in which we partly act in different social roles in the
same social space. On social media like Facebook, we act in various roles, but
all of these roles become mapped onto single profiles that are observed by
different people that are associated with our different social roles. This means
that social media like Facebook are social spaces in which social roles tend to
converge and become integrated in single profiles.
Integrated and converging surveillance on social media: On social media like
Facebook, various social activities (cognition, communication, co-operation) in
different social roles that belong to our behavior in systems (economy, state)
and the lifeworld (the private sphere, the socio-economic sphere, the socio-
political sphere, the socio-cultural sphere) are mapped to single profiles. In this
mapping process, data about (a) social activities within (b) social roles are
generated. This means that a Facebook profile holds (a1) personal data, (a2)
communicative data, (a3) social network data/community data in relation to
(b1) private roles (friend, lover, relative, father, mother, child, etc.), (b2) civic
roles (socio-cultural roles as fan community members, neighborhood associa-
tion members, etc.), (b3) public roles (socio-economic and socio-political roles
as activists and advocates), (b4) systemic roles (in politics: voter, citizen, client,
politician, bureaucrat, etc.; in the economy: worker, manager, owner, purchas-
er/consumer, etc.). The different social roles and activities tend to converge,
for instance, in the situation where the workplace is also a playground, where
friendships and intimate relations are formed and dissolved and where spare
time activities are conducted. The emergence of social media has intensified
the historical trend of the break-down of the boundaries between play and
labor, work time and leisure time, production and consumption, the factory and
the household, public and private life. Concepts such as digital labor, online
prosumption, consumption work, produsage, crowdsourcing, freeconomy or
playbor (play labor) have been used to describe transformations in the media,
culture and society associated with social media. What Zygmunt Bauman (2005)
has alternately called liquid life and liquid world is both precondition and
result of social media. The liquefaction of the social is both medium and out-
come of social media.
Figure 4 visualizes the surveillance process on one single social media sys-
tem (such as Facebook, etc.). The total social media surveillance process is the
combination and network of a multitude of such processes.
Social media surveillance monitors converging social activities of humans
in their converging social roles on social media platforms in order to exert
actual or potential violence. Let us briefly come back to the two examples from
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Figure 4: The process of social media surveillance.
the introduction: The UK police plans to expand social media surveillance in
order to prevent online crime/terrorism and to catch actual criminals and ter-
rorists. The idea is to monitor social media content and behavior in order to
identify potential offenders so that their future behavior can be prevented by
disciplinary action on the part of the state and that actual offenders can be
brought to trial. The basic idea is to use social media data in order to exert
state violence against those who do not respect the rules set by existing laws,
that is, to limit the basic human need of free movement in cyberspace for those
who offend against these laws, and to prevent criminal and terrorist behavior
by threatening potential offenders with the announcement that social media
are being monitored and misconduct will be punished by the violent actions of
the state. In the case of the monitoring of employees’ social media behavior by
employers, the basic idea is to gather data about social media use in order to
prevent employees from exerting the human need of information and communi-
cation via internet use during work time; work time being seen as profit-gener-
ating time that benefits the company. Employees are to be controlled by using
the threat of disciplinary action and the announcement that their online behav-
ior is being monitored. In both cases, social media surveillance conducted by
the police and by companies, the idea is to gather data in order to discipline
behavior that is thought to violate set rules, or to punish those who violate
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those rules. In both cases, violence shall be inflicted in order to defend existing
norms. A crucial consequence of social media surveillance is that violence is
not only inflicted on those who actually violate rules set by the state or compa-
nies, but that a large store of personal data about citizens and employees is
generated that can be used in various contexts for exerting violence against
these groups. The actual data gathering for preventive and disciplinary means
turns into a large surveillance machine that can harm humans in various con-
texts if the data are stored, known, analyzed, assessed, networked, or if predic-
tive analysis is performed based on them.
Social media surveillance is a form of surveillance in which different both
forms of sociality (cognition, communication, co-operation) and different social
roles of individuals (in the economy, politics, and civil society) converge so that
surveillance becomes a monitoring of different (partly converging) activities in
different, partly converging, social roles with the help of profiles that hold a
complex networked multitude of data about humans.
Social media surveillance is a techno-social process in which human actors
make use of surveillance technologies for monitoring human activities on social
media. They can make use of various technologies for this purpose: One of
them is the so-called Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) internet surveillance. DPI
internet surveillance technologies are communication surveillance tools that
are able to monitor the traffic of network data that is sent over the internet at
all seven layers of the OSI reference model of internet communication, which
corresponds to the five layers of the TCP/IP. This means that DPI surveillance
includes the surveillance of internet content data (for a detailed analysis of the
societal and ideological impacts of DPI, see Fuchs, 2013). In addition, human
actors can rely on open source intelligence (OSINT), which refers to search
engines and other software that can retrieve relevant content from publically
accessible social media content. They may also install ‘Trojans’ or other mali-
cious software on a target’s computing device in order to directly intercept
their communication on social media. Less explicitly technological means for
retrieving social media content include issuing legal requests for data to social
media companies as well as manually searching for content. However, these
last two examples nevertheless rely on technologies such as computing devices,
servers and modems that are integral to the functioning of social media plat-
forms.
Social media surveillance is not only a process the communication and
information processes of which need to be theorized. Also its implications for
society need to be further discussed, which is the goal of the next section.
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5 Discussion: Categorical suspicion, social
sorting and surveillance creep – 3 societal
implications of social media surveillance
A first societal implication of surveillance has to do with the phenomenon of
categorical suspicion. Categorical suspicion means that due to surveillance
technologies “everyone becomes a reasonable target. The new forms of control
are helping to create a society where everyone is guilty until proven innocent;
technologies that permit continuous, rather than intermittent, monitoring en-
courage this” (Marx, 1988, p. 219). Since 9/11, surveillance has been intensified
and as a result, contemporary “forms of surveillance, more than ever before,
create categories of suspicion” (Lyon, 2003a, p. 10).
The focus on fighting and preventing terrorism and the creation of a culture
of categorical suspicion is one of the societal contexts of social media surveil-
lance. Social media contain a lot of data about personal interests and social
relations. The police and secret services have therefore developed a special
interest in being able to monitor social media usage, as evidenced by the exis-
tence of the global PRISM internet surveillance program. Police surveillance of
social media in the situation of post-9/11 categorical suspicion can easily result
in the constant monitoring of social media activities of citizens and the police
assumption that all users are actual or potential criminals and terrorists until
proven innocent. There is also the danger that social media surveillance con-
ducted by the police is especially directed towards groups that already face
discrimination in Western societies, like immigrants, people of color, people of
Arabic or African background, the poor, the unemployed, or political activists,
and that thereby stereotypes and discrimination are deepened and reified.
A second societal implication of surveillance is the actual or potential fos-
tering of social sorting as a specific form of discrimination. Oscar H. Gandy
(1993) has in this context coined the notion of the panoptic sort. It is a system
of power and disciplinary surveillance that identifies, classifies, and assesses
(Gandy, 1993, p. 15). David Lyon (2003b) considers Gandy’s notion of the panop-
tic sort in relation to computers and the internet as social sorting. In newer
works, Gandy (2009) has pointed out the connection of social sorting and cu-
mulative disadvantages: “Cumulative disadvantage refers to the ways in which
historical disadvantages cumulate over time, and across categories of experi-
ence” (Gandy, 2009, p. 12). Thus, membership in a targeted group as well as
other kinds of disadvantage become a dominant factor in determining future
negative social outcomes: “People who have bad luck in one area, are likely to
suffer from bad luck in other areas as well” (Gandy, 2009, p. 116).
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This means that if you have dark skin, are poor, live in a deprived neigh-
borhood, have become unemployed or ill, etc., you are more likely to be dis-
criminated against and flagged as a risk group by data mining and other social
sorting technologies. The arbitrary disadvantages an individual has suffered
then cumulate and result in further disadvantages that are enforced by predic-
tive algorithms which calculate based on certain previous behavior that an
individual is part of a risk group and should therefore be discriminated against
(by not being offered a service, being offered a lower quality service at a higher
price – e.g., in the case of a loan or mortgage –, by being considered as a
criminal or terrorist, etc.). “Once they have been identified as criminals, or
even as potential criminals, poor people, and black people in particular, are
systematically barred from the opportunities they might otherwise use to im-
prove their status in life” (Gandy, 2009, p. 141).
Social media profiles are a historical accumulation and storage of online
behavior and interests. Social media tend to never forget what users are doing
online, but tend to keep profiles of personal data and thereby provide a founda-
tion for the algorithmic or human analysis of who belongs to a so-called risk
group and should be treated in a special way. Commercial social media surveil-
lance uses specific data from social media profiles for targeting advertising
and providing special offers. As a result, privileged groups tend to be treated
differently than the poor and outcast. Another effect of commercial social me-
dia surveillance is that consumer culture and the fostering of a world that is
based on the logic of commodities has become almost ubiquitous on the inter-
net. If state intelligence agencies obtain access to social media profile data and
combine such data with state-administered records (such as databases covering
crime, welfare and unemployment benefits, health records, etc.), then discrimi-
nation based on cumulative disadvantages can be advanced. The quality of
social media to cover and store data about various social roles and social activi-
ties that converge in social media profiles allows commercial and state surveil-
lance to use social media data for advancing discrimination that is based on
algorithmic profiling and predictions as well as the networking of data from
various sources. Data collection on commercial social media is permanent, con-
stant, totalizing, and works in real time and covers a lot of activities in various
everyday social roles of billions of humans worldwide. The potential for unfair
treatment and racist, classist, sexist, or other forms of discrimination are there-
by greatly enhanced.
Gary Marx has introduced the notion of the surveillance creep: “As power-
ful new surveillance tactics are developed, the range of their legitimate and
illegitimate use is likely to spread” (Marx, 1988, pp. 2 f.; see also Lyon, 2007,
p. 201). Social media like Facebook tend to naturalize the idea of humans being
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under constant surveillance. It becomes a habitual behavior of social media
users to make parts of their profiles and content visible to the public and to
laterally observe what others are doing and posting. Publicity is part of the
attraction of social media.
Commercial social media, just like, for example, location-based services
on mobile phones, the prevalence of CCTV in public spaces, surveillance as
entertainment in popular culture (reality TV, paparazzi journalism, etc.) or se-
curity checks as entrance conditions to transportation, are practices of surveil-
lance creep in everyday life. Social media sites like Facebook contain advertis-
ing schemes that repurpose personal information into marketing data. Also,
their compliance with law enforcement and security agencies suggests a sur-
veillance creep where this same information is repurposed as evidence and
intelligence. The effect is that contemporary society is tending to become ever
more controlled by commercial enterprise and the logic of policing and law
and order. As more and more social life is represented as content on social
media, this content can become the foundation of the commodification, com-
mercialization and the policification of society and everyday life.
6 Conclusion
Social media surveillance is a relatively new form of surveillance that is based
on making visible the convergence of social roles and social activities to power-
ful institutions, especially companies and the state. As we spend more and
more time online on social media, a lot of our everyday activities in different
roles during a lot of our working and free time become accessible, traceable,
analyzable in real time to institutions with whom we do not necessarily have a
relationship of trust. The prevalent danger of the intensification and extension
of surveillance via social media and other technologies is that we create a socie-
ty that is totalitarian in the double-sense of being a dictatorship of the market
and capitalist logic as well as a state dictatorship. The logics of commercial
surveillance and state surveillance in fact tend to interact. One example is the
use of credit card data by the police to locate terrorists. Ben-Hayes (2012) argues
in this context that a surveillance-industrial complex is emerging. The inter-
locking of state and commercial surveillance poses considerable threats for so-
ciety.
We see two important implications of this analysis. First, we think it is
important to conduct such analyses of the internet and social media in a critical
way. We do not only need Internet Studies and Social Media Studies, but rather
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we need Critical Internet Studies and Critical Social Media Studies (Fuchs and
Dyer-Witheford, 2013). The surveillance implications of social media for society
require us to give special attention to the power structures as well as actual
and potential negative consequences of social media for society. We therefore
hold that it is of utmost importance to foster research that uncovers how ICTs
can harm humans in societal contexts of crisis, inequality and asymmetric pow-
er structures.
Second, we think that it is politically important that tendencies towards
the creation of a totalitarian surveillance society are resisted and that move-
ments and civil society groups that engage in this resistance are supported.
One example of such civil society action is the State of Surveillance project
(www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/12/01/the-state-of-surveillance-the-data)
operated by Privacy International and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism
that has published a database of companies that sell communications surveil-
lance technologies. A related project is the WikiLeaks’ SpyFiles (spyfiles.org)
database that leaked documents showing how various companies from differ-
ent countries engage in fostering the surveillance of the internet, mobile
phones, and location-based technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation
operates a section on its website that documents problems of surveillance on
social networking sites (www.eff.org/issues/social-networks). Austrian legal
students have founded the initiative Europe vs. Facebook that has filed 22 com-
plaints against privacy violations conducted by Facebook to the Irish Data Pro-
tection Commissioner (europe-v-facebook.org/EN/en.html). In 2008, the Cana-
dian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) filed a complaint
containing 22 alleged privacy violations against Facebook to the Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada (cippic.ca/en/news/339/54/CIPPIC-files-
privacy-complaint-against-Facebook). There are also alternative social media
projects that try to establish a surveillance-free, privacy-respecting, non-com-
mercial internet. Examples include the social networking site projects Diaspora
(https://joindiaspora.com/), N-1 (https://n-1.cc), identi.ca (https://identi.ca/),
StatusNet (http://status.net/), Quitter (http://useqwitter.com/), Crabgrass
(https://we.riseup.net/crabgrass/), Friendica (http://friendica.com/)1 In 2014,
the social network Ello started presenting itself as an advertising-free alterna-
tive to Facebook, but in fact it is just like Facebook being driven by profit
interests, is funded by venture capital, and seeks a commodification strategy
that allows capital accumulation.
1 For an overview, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_software_and_protocols_
for_distributed_social_networking
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Foucault (1980) and Giddens’ (1985) concepts of power and surveillance
are fairly different, but both agree that there is a necessary relationship be-
tween power and counter-power. In relationship to surveillance this means that
Foucault and Giddens think that wherever there is a specific form of disciplina-
ry power and control, there is also the counter-power of those under surveil-
lance. We do, however, think that both Foucault and Giddens are overestimat-
ing counter-power as a deterministic necessity. The existence of the NSA’s large-
scale PRISM surveillance system that systematically monitors the content of
activities of internet users on platforms and IT systems operated by Microsoft,
Apple, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Skype and Paltalk remained unknown to the
public for a long-time. There was large-scale surveillance, but no resistance to
it. Only Edward Snowden’s leaks to the public enabled the latters gain knowl-
edge of the system, thus creating preconditions for public resistance. The
PRISM case shows that surveillance is often hidden, covert, invisible, and not
known to those who are being monitored. Knowing that you are being moni-
tored is, however, a first precondition for resisting it. There is no necessity
that surveillance leads to resistance. Resistance is always a possibility, but no
necessity. Given the non-deterministic relationship of surveillance and resist-
ance in particular and of power and counter-power in general, we have chosen
not to make resistance part of the model of social media surveillance that is
visualized in Figure 4. This does, however, not mean that we do not consider
resistance as possible or important; it rather means that we do not like Giddens
and Foucault see an automatism of resistance. Resistance is an activity that
needs to be organized and mobilized, which requires knowledge, resources and
collective action.
New forms of social media and internet surveillance are constantly evolv-
ing. It is therefore necessary to continue to study these developments in a criti-
cal way, so as to foster the institutional conditions for conducting Critical Social
Media Studies, and to ensure the diffusion of such critical knowledge into the
sphere of civil society and activism that tries to bring about political change
and which prevents the emergence of a totalitarian surveillance society thereby
fostering the use of ICTs in ways that advance the establishment of a participa-
tory, sustainable, and equitable information society.
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